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INTRODUCTION
The world of work has changed dramatically for immigrants
since the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
in 19521 and its 1965 amendment.2 Since the late 1940s, Congress
contemplated worksite immigration enforcement as a way to deal
with undocumented immigration.3 In 1986, Congress enacted the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”),4 which amended
the INA and, for the first time, implemented a worksite enforcement
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
3. The calls were in response to a growing number of temporary workers admitted
through the Bracero Program, which produced more than four million temporary workers
between 1942 and 1964. See PHILIP MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS,
IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM WORKERS 48 (2003).
4. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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system and employer sanctions for knowingly hiring undocumented
workers.5 Since then, the federal government’s focus on worksite
immigration enforcement has been on employers. Nonetheless, there
has been a gradual and subtle shift over the decades from a discussion
about the use of an employer sanction system designed to dissuade
employers from recruiting foreign labor to present-day calls for
criminalizing unauthorized work at the state level. Importantly, this
shift in focus is not reflected in the federal law, which sanctions
employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers but not
employees for performing undocumented work. Employers have
succeeded in weakening the provisions created to dissuade them from
hiring undocumented workers, thus shifting the scrutiny, at least at
the state level, to the workers themselves. Calls for regulating
immigration by criminalizing the worker have increased.6 The result is
an expanding deportation (and now detention) apparatus increasingly
focusing on undocumented workers.7 State efforts to criminalize the
use of false identifying information to obtain work exemplify this
gradual shift to a focus on workers.
How did we get here? This Article focuses on the criminalization
of false use of Social Security numbers or other employment
authorization documents for work and proceeds in three parts. Part I
follows the transformation of temporary work in the United States
from a legal guestworker-type program to the development of the
federal employer sanctions system to deal with the failures of past
guestworker programs. This Part demonstrates the consequences of
the employer sanctions system and the Supreme Court’s approach to
federal and state roles in worksite immigration enforcement. It then
introduces Congress’s enactment of identity theft laws and their effect
on worksite enforcement. Part II demonstrates how the workers
themselves have increasingly become the targets of enforcement. It
reveals the move over the past decade by states to enact identity theft
statutes that include the false use of identifying information for work.
Part III explores whether states’ attempts to criminalize the use of
false Social Security numbers for work are preempted, given
Congress’s dual purpose to regulate immigration in the workplace
and to protect individuals from identity theft. The Article concludes
with a call for a return to Congress’s intent of disincentivizing the

5. Id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012).
6. See Janice Kephart, Fixing Flores: Assuring Adequate Penalties for Identity Theft
and Fraud, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Jan. 2010), http://cis.org/Flores-Figueroa.
7. See infra Part I.D.
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employer preference for undocumented workers rather than placing
the blame on the workers who are drawn into the migration stream.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKPLACE IMMIGRATION
REGULATION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A. The Making of the Temporary Worker Through Immigration
Regulation in Twentieth Century Immigration Law
Several scholars have written about the sometimes-conflicting
goals of temporary worker and contract labor programs to (1) provide
a steady labor supply to some of the most needy industries (mostly
agricultural), (2) protect jobs for available U.S. workers, and (3)
regulate immigration into the United States.8 Through these
programs, the interests of labor and the interests of employers who
need the temporary labor are mediated by federal agencies, namely
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”), or its predecessor, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”).9 In ongoing negotiations over the
need and the number of immigrants required to fill positions, the
related goals of adequate employment law enforcement and
preservation of living wage standards for the available jobs have
become secondary to the twin goals of preserving jobs for Americans
and immigration enforcement.
Calls for worksite immigration regulation to dissuade employers
from hiring undocumented workers occurred against this backdrop.
In response to these competing goals, legislators not only restricted
immigration but also tried to regulate private actors by, for example,
making it a crime to harbor illegal aliens.10 While the concept of
employer sanctions was floated in legislative proposals leading up to
the first comprehensive immigration law in 1952, none were
successful.11 Nonetheless, the debates leading up to the Immigration
8. See, e.g., George C. Kiser, Mexican American Labor Before World War II, 2 J.
MEX. AM. HIST. 122, 131–32 (1972).
9. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. 181 (2d ed. 2010).
10. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat.
163, 228–29 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)). The provision makes it an
immigration violation to bring an alien into the United States other than through a
designated port of entry, or to otherwise induce, transport, conceal, harbor, or shield an
undocumented person in the United States. Id.
11. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R55-752, 96TH CONG. REP. ON TEMPORARY WORKER
PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 39–40 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter CRS
WORKER] (“Attempts to pass legislation prohibiting the employment of and establishing
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and Nationality Act of 1952 and its 1965 amendment mirrored the
later discussions over the efficacy of worksite immigration
enforcement that led to employer sanctions in 1986.12
B.

The 1952 and 1965 Immigration and Nationality Acts

Congress formally debated guestworker programs as part of
immigration law in the early 1950s. Before then, guest workers were
considered the product of contract labor agreements and not
necessarily part of the immigration regulatory scheme. Part of the
debate at the time was whether authority over a guestworker program
should rest with the DOL or INS.13 This debate reflected the tug-ofwar between the DOL and INS over the use of the immigration
system enforcement mechanisms to regularize Mexican workers for
employers.14 This recurring debate assumed Mexicans would enter the
United States to work and return to Mexico after the work was
completed.15 Mexican labor, in other words, was cast in the debates as
transient or temporary, as evidenced by their status under the thenexisting Bracero Program.16 When Congress enacted the H-2
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 allowing for
guest workers,17 there was much lobbying for folding the Bracero
Program,18 authorized under a separate contract labor agreement and

penalties for the harboring of illegal aliens in 1951 and 1952 were only partially
successful . . . . [During debates,] Senator Paul Douglas offered an amendment to provide
penalties for the employment of illegal aliens . . . . It was resoundingly defeated.”).
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 123–27 (discussing the INS “wrangling” with the DOL
over control of the guestworker program).
14. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICA 152–53 (William Chafe et al. eds., 2004).
15. This characterization of Mexican labor as transient or temporary was cast early in
the history of federal immigration regulation, in part because immigration regulation
divided into a two-tiered bureaucracy. The Bureau of Immigration within the Department
of Labor regulated temporary workers from Mexico and other parts of the Western
Hemisphere. See DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF
IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 168 (2002); Leticia M. Saucedo, Mexicans,
Immigrants, Cultural Narratives and National Origin, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 321–33 (2012).
16. TICHENOR, supra note 15, at 152, 173.
17. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163,
168 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2012)).
18. For a more in-depth discussion of the Bracero Program, see generally DEBORAH
COHEN, BRACEROS: MIGRANT CITIZENS AND TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECTS IN THE
POSTWAR UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (2011) (describing the development of the
Bracero Program as a bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico and the
responses of American and Mexican workers to the Program).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1505 (2015)

1510

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

legislation, into the proposed guest worker provisions. Congress
ultimately declined.19
During this period, the calls for curbing undocumented
immigration were growing. President Truman advocated for
employer sanctions—harsh and stiff penalties for employers who
knowingly hired undocumented workers—as well as increased
immigration authority to inspect workplaces without warrants.20
Employer sanctions were hotly debated and ultimately defeated by a
large margin.21 After much debate, the 1952 Act included a
compromise: the criminalization of the willful importation,
transportation, or harboring of illegal aliens.22 This crime was
considered a felony punishable by a $2,000 fine or imprisonment of
up to five years, or both.23 The provision was initially introduced as a
penalty for employers who actively engaged in recruiting and bringing
workers into the country.24 After much lobbying, however,
employment of undocumented workers was specifically exempted
from the harboring definition.25
After Congress enacted the 1952 Act, proposals to curtail
undocumented immigration from Mexico continued to emerge.26
Around the same time, the immigration agency began a massive
deportation campaign known as Operation Wetback.27 Proposals for
employer sanctions again surfaced, with the purpose of encouraging
employers to use the Bracero Program—rather than undocumented
workers—for their labor needs.28 These proposals were defeated, in
part because employers strongly objected to government intrusion
into the worksite.29 At the time, employers and government agencies
still considered contract labor programs outside the realm of
traditional immigration regulation.30

19. CRS WORKER, supra note 11, at 53.
20. Id. at 38.
21. Id. at 39–40.
22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 163,
228–29 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324).
23. Id.
24. CRS WORKER, supra note 11, at 39–40.
25. Id. at 40.
26. JUAN RAMÓN GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 161 (1980).
27. Id. at 169, 183.
28. Id. at 160–61.
29. Id. at 161–63.
30. See TICHENOR, supra note 15, at 150–51 (describing the two-tiered immigration
regulation system consisting of permanent immigration on the one hand and temporary
labor programs on the other).
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The 1965 Act abolished the long-held tradition of national
origins quotas embedded in immigration law.31 The law is seen as a
triumph of liberalism over the conservative restrictionist views that
excluded generations of Asians and others from a rightful place in the
migration stream.32 The law also limited the number of immigrant
visas available for unskilled manual work, a decision that mostly
affected Mexican workers.33 Furthermore, the 1965 Act was not
generous to temporary workers, in part because of the heavy pressure
from organized labor and others to end foreign-contract labor
programs. During the hearings on the 1965 Act, the AFL-CIO urged
that any amendments to the Act allow only for permanent and not
temporary immigration for work.34 The House Report on the 1965
amendments also clarified that there was no path to permanent status
in the proposed preference categories that were to replace national
origins quotas.35 The Senate Report on the 1965 amendments was also
silent on the subject of temporary agricultural labor, noting that
“[t]he bill specifically provides that skilled or unskilled labor of a
temporary or seasonal nature is not to be entitled to any preference
under the selection system for the allocation of immigrant visas.”36
To ensure that the temporary Mexican labor program was not
simply replaced with a path to permanent residence, the 1965
Congress imposed caps on the immigrant visas available to the
western hemisphere countries.37 The move was made in the name of
31. Congress enacted emergency national origins quotas in 1921, which were set to
expire on June 30, 1922. Emergency Quota Act, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 5, 42 Stat. 5, 7 (1921).
Congress then made quotas permanent in the 1924 Immigration Act, which set the annual
quota of any nationality at two percent of the number of immigrants from that country
resident in the U.S. in 1890. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(a), 43 Stat.
153, 159 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The INA of 1965 finally
abolished the national origins quotas. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911, 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) (“The immigration pool and the quotas of quota areas shall terminate June 30,
1968.”).
32. Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1996).
33. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911,
912–14 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012)); see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42560, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED
STATES: POLICY AND TRENDS 7–8 (2012) (discussing how an increased push for Mexican
migration coincided with the reduced availability of visas for those workers).
34. CRS WORKER, supra note 11, at 68.
35. Id. at 68–69.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Douglas A. Massey & Karen A. Pren, Unintended Consequences of US
Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, 38 POPULATION
& DEV. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
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fairness. Congress denounced the inequity of imposing caps on the
rest of the world while leaving the Western Hemisphere relatively
free of such regulation.38 The 1965 Congress ignored, however, the
level of regulation occurring both through temporary work programs
and through inadmissibility provisions aimed at controlling Mexican
immigration. Once the temporary programs were eliminated and caps
placed on immigration, the rise of undocumented immigration was
inevitable. Sociologist Douglas Massey notes that while the numbers
of legal immigrants remained fairly constant between 1965 and 1985,
the number of temporary workers decreased and the numbers of
illegal entrants increased at roughly the same levels.39 According to
Massey’s calculations, the temporary worker population went from
about 450,000 in 1955 to almost zero by 1968, while the
undocumented population went from about 50,000 to about 400,000
by 1975.40
C.

The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986

By 1986, the consequences of failing to create a viable legal path
for immigration workers coming to the United States from Mexico
were evident, although their implications were highly contested. On
the one hand, immigration advocates joined with employers and
others to push for a path to permanent residence and citizenship.41 On
the other hand, restrictionists called for increased border enforcement
and employer sanctions to curb illegal immigration flows.42 The result
was again a compromise.
In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,43 Congress
finally implemented the employer sanctions provisions that had been
debated since the 1950s.44 The main provision states that “[i]t is
unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer
for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the
alien is an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such employment.”45

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182–83.
TIMOTHY J. HENDERSON, BEYOND BORDERS: A HISTORY OF MEXICAN
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 113 (Jürgen Buchenau ed., 2011).
43. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
44. Id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012); CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182 (“[T]he
political engine in IRCA was the employer sanctions provision, making it illegal to
knowingly employ unauthorized workers.”).
45. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).
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The statute also calls for sanctions for a “pattern and practice” of
activity that shows regular, repeated, and intentional activities related
to knowingly hiring undocumented workers.46 Therefore, the statute
explicitly and clearly placed the onus on employers to ensure that
unauthorized hiring ceased. At the time, Congress intended this
section of the statute to apply to employers, who were responsible for
verifying employment.47 The statute imposed clear sanctions for
breach of this new responsibility.48
The statute’s fraud provision was likewise aimed at employers.49
The provision makes it a felony offense to use a false identification
document, or misuse a real one, for the purpose of satisfying the
employer’s verification requirements.50 This provision requires all
employers to verify and document that all of their employees have the
legal right to work in the United States.51 The fraud subsection
penalizes fraud in the employer’s use of documents to satisfy the
verification requirements.52 Recall that Congress’s purpose was to
dissuade employers from pulling illegal immigrants into the country
for employment.53 Thus, the provision achieves Congress’s intent to
place responsibility on employers to document their employees’ work
authorization to the federal government.54
At the time of deliberation, the employer sanctions provision was
promoted as one of several effective tools for shutting down illegal
immigration.55 By including worksites in the immigration enforcement
scheme, immigration regulation would surely become more efficient
and effective.56 Employers were not so enthusiastic about their
proposed responsibilities for immigration regulation, in large part
because the statute proposed to make them responsible for the
46. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f).
47. For discussion of congressional purpose and intent, see Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012).
48. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
49. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b).
50. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b).
51. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b).
52. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). The provision imposes a fine or imprisonment
to anyone who uses “(1) an identification document, knowing (or having reason to know)
that the document was not issued lawfully for the use of the possessor, (2) an identification
document knowing (or having reason to know) that the document is false, or (3) a false
attestation” to verify employment authorization. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)(1)–(3).
53. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
54. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b).
55. See S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 7–8 (1983) (describing the congressional plan to
discourage immigration through broader enforcement coupled with an employer sanctions
system).
56. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182.
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migration flow.57 After some advocacy during the deliberation over
the efficacy of employer sanctions, Congress weakened the provision
with a safe harbor amendment for employers that requested
documentation from workers regardless of its validity.58
In 1990, Congress added some enforcement teeth by giving the
INS the authority to assess monetary penalties against an employer
for failure to comply with the employer sanctions provisions, whether
such failure was willful or reckless.59 In 1996, however, the employer
sanctions provisions were further weakened. With the Sonny Bono
Amendment—named after its sponsor—Congress allowed employers
to correct “technical or procedural” I-9 employee verification
document violations if they resulted from a “good faith” effort to
comply with employment verification requirements and so long as the
mistakes were corrected within ten days of notice by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).60
The employer sanctions regulations now provide a safe harbor
for employers who did not “knowingly hire” undocumented
workers.61 This was done at the behest of employers who argued that
they should not be held strictly liable for criminal fines and
sanctions.62 The regulation states:
An employer or a recruiter or referrer for a fee for employment
who shows good faith compliance with the employment
verification requirements of § 274a.2(b) of this part shall have
established a rebuttable affirmative defense that the person or
entity has not violated section 274A(a)(1)(A) of the Act with
respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.63
In response to concerns that an employer sanctions system would
incentivize the creation of systems to produce and distribute false
documents, IRCA also included fraud provisions sanctioning
individuals who use false or fraudulent documents to obtain
employment.64 The penalties for workers include civil fines,65
57. Id.
58. Id. at 183; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3360, 3360–61 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3)).
59. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 544, 104 Stat. 4978, 5057–59
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c).
60. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 411, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-666 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)).
61. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182.
62. Id. at 182–83.
63. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4 (2014).
64. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 103, 100 Stat.
3360, 3360–61 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)).
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immigration penalties,66 and criminal sanctions.67 Importantly,
Congress limited both the immigration penalties and the enforcement
of fraud to enforcement by federal agencies.68
Given the congressional purpose to focus on employer sanctions,
ICE has used its discretion in worksite enforcement to rely heavily on
immigration penalties and civil sanctions rather than criminal
sanctions.69 ICE priorities have also changed with administrations.
For example, in 1999, enforcement focused on employers who
practiced a pattern of knowingly hiring undocumented workers and
on employers who abused workers and violated various employment
laws.70 After the terrorist attacks in 2001, worksite enforcement
activities shifted to removal of undocumented workers from military
bases and airports.71 According to a Congressional Research Service
(“CRS”) report, between 2003 and 2012 ICE brought 20,631
administrative (civil) charges, compared to 5,131 criminal charges in
worksite enforcement operations.72 Since 2008, the numbers of both
civil and criminal charges have diminished significantly, reflecting
ICE’s renewed focus on employers.73 In 2012, almost half of the
criminal arrests in worksites were of managerial employees, indicating
the arrests were for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers.74 As a
recent CRS report noted, “ICE administrative and criminal arrests in
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(d)(3) (2012).
66. Id. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(i) (making “[a]n alien who is the subject of a final order for
violation of section 1324c of this title [] deportable”); id. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (making those
who make false claims to citizenship, including for purposes of employment verification,
inadmissible).
67. Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(F) (limiting criminal sanctions to specified federal statutes and
requiring that information provided for employment verification “not be used for law
enforcement purposes, other than for enforcement of this chapter or sections 1001
[relating to false statements], 1028 [relating to fraud in connection with identity
documents], 1546 [relating to fraud in immigration documents], and 1621 [relating to
perjury] of title 18”).
68. See id. § 1324a(b)(5) (limiting use of the Form I-9 attestation form “and any
information contained in or appended to such form” to “enforcement of this chapter and
sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of title 18”); id. § 1324a(d)(2)(F).
69. See TICHENOR, supra note 15, at 262–63 (describing the lax employer sanctions
policies that developed from the inception of the legislation); see also Kitty Calavita,
Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1049–55 (1990) (describing how low level fines and sanctions
correlate with widespread disregard of the employer sanctions provisions by employers).
70. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40002, IMMIGRATION-RELATED
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 2 (2013) [hereinafter CRS
REPORT].
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 7.
74. Id. at 8.
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worksite enforcement operations represent a very small percentage of
the potential population of [immigration] violators.”75 At the high
mark of administrative arrests in 2008, for example, ICE arrested
5,184 people at worksites.76 That year there were an estimated 8.3
million undocumented immigrants in the United States.77
Today, the executive branch, in implementing IRCA, has shifted
the focus back to employer responsibility through strong labor and
employment enforcement that parallels the immigration enforcement
scheme.78 This approach aims to become an integrated part of the
federal plan to deter undocumented employment. As one
commentator noted:
Enforcement activity by the [DOL] is also relevant to a
discussion of federal efforts to curtail unauthorized
employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum
wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a
significant percentage of its enforcement resources on low-wage
industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and
presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers.79
Enforcement of employment laws sends a signal to employers that the
federal government will use multiple enforcement mechanisms to
hold employers accountable. Recently, the Obama administration
initiated the development of an interagency taskforce, including the
Department of Labor, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Justice, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and National Labor Relations Board to ensure that undocumented
workers did not bear the brunt of enforcement efforts against
80
unauthorized immigration. Among its priorities, the Work Group
will seek to ensure that “federal enforcement authorities are not used
by parties seeking to undermine worker protection laws by enmeshing
immigration authorities in labor disputes.”81 This shift in enforcement
priorities acknowledges that employers have developed strategies to
exploit workers and deter them from asserting their rights, despite the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2009).
78. See Fact Sheet: Establishment of Interagency Work Group for the Consistent
Enforcement of Federal Labor, Employment and Immigration Laws , U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/fact-sheet/immigration/interagency-working-group.htm (last visited
Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter DOL Fact Sheet].
79. CRS REPORT, supra note 70, at i.
80. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 78.
81. Id.
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emphasis in immigration law on an employer sanctions worksite
enforcement regime.82
D. The Evolution of Agency Immigration Regulation from Border
Apprehensions to Interior Enforcement and Deportations
Over the past twenty years, immigration enforcement has shifted
from the border to the interior. The immigration system consists of
two agencies, ICE83 and Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”).84 ICE
conducts interior enforcement efforts while CBP conducts
enforcement at border points within 100 miles of the border.85
Apprehensions moved from the border to the interior starting in the
1990s, and, by 2011, interior apprehensions amounted to almost half
of the total.86 Coincidentally, this shift correlates with increased state
interest in immigration regulation.
The Obama administration has overseen the largest number of
deportations in the history of immigration enforcement.87 The
administration has deported more immigrants in its first five years
than the Bush administration did in its eight-year tenure.88 More than
4.5 million noncitizens have been deported from the United States
since 1996, when Congress passed very restrictive immigration
legislation.89 Since then, formal removals have increased from
approximately 70,000 in 1996 to 420,000 in 2012.90 This growth in

82. Id.
83. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ero (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
84. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov (last visited Apr. 28,
2015); CBP Through the Years, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/
about/history (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
85. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, supra note 83; 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2)
(2014).
86. See Massey & Pren, supra note 37, at 15, 27.
87. Alejandra Marchevsky & Beth Baker, Why Has President Obama Deported More
Immigrants Than Any President in US History?, NATION (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/179099/why-has-president-obama-deported-moreimmigrants-any-president-us-history.
88. MARC ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE
DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 1
(2014), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-dilemmareconciling-tough-humane-enforcement.
89. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also, ROSENBLUM & MEISSNER, supra note 88, at 1
(“More than 4.5 million noncitizens have been deported from the United States since
Congress passed sweeping legislation in 1996 to toughen the nation’s immigration
enforcement system.”).
90. ROSENBLUM & MEISSNER, supra note 88, at 1.
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deportations is mostly from interior enforcement activities.91 The
increased enforcement mechanism could not be carried out through
ICE enforcement alone since there are only slightly over 20,000 ICE
enforcement personnel throughout the country.92 To address this
shortfall, Congress and the executive branch established collaborative
programs with state and local governments to identify and hold
undocumented immigrants who end up in local jails.93 Programs like
Secure Communities94 led to a massive increase in the numbers of
undocumented immigrants arrested and held for ICE authorities.95
The Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”), a program within ICE
responsible for identifying removable noncitizens in state and local
jails and prisons, produced the vast majority of deportations in the
last decade.96 The program relies on local and state penal institutions
to share lists of detainees who may be removable.97
Sociologists Massey and Pren explain that while the shift to
interior enforcement and deportations was rooted in a desire for
security and the fear of terrorism, it resulted in the massive
deportations of Latinos:
In the 1990s the Cold War was replaced by the threat of
terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 and the 2001 Patriot Act intensified border
enforcement and, more importantly, brought about a sharp rise
in deportations from the United States. Deportations replaced
border apprehensions as the visible manifestation of the Latino
threat. Although the resulting feedback look was not as
powerful as the apprehension-based loop that prevailed from

91. Massey & Pren, supra note 37, at 15.
92. See History of ICE, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/history (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
93. Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
94. Id.
95. See id. The Obama administration recently discontinued the Secure Communities
program and replaced it with the Priority Enforcement Program. See Memorandum, Jeh
Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities 1–3 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf.
96. See The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and
Jails, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/criminal-alienprogram-cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails (last visited Apr. 28, 2015)
(describing the CAP program as responsible for the largest number of noncitizen
apprehensions).
97. Id. (“Penal institutions that participate in CAP share information about their
inmates with ICE and allow ICE agents to interview suspected removable immigrants.”).
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1965 to 1995, it was potent nonetheless and deportations
expanded even as apprehensions fell in the decade after 2000.98
The growing criticism of the federal government’s interior
enforcement efforts led the Obama administration to rescind its
enforcement policies.99 On November 20, 2014, DHS discontinued its
Secure Communities program, replacing it with a Priority
Enforcement Program.100 Under the new program, the federal
government will advise local and state law enforcement authorities
that it will seek the transfer to federal immigration authorities of only
those who are national security risks or who have been convicted of
high-priority crimes.101 These crimes include gang-related offenses;
offenses classified as felonies in the convicting jurisdiction, other than
a state or local offense for which an essential element was the alien’s
immigration status; and aggravated felonies, as that term is defined in
the immigration statute.102 Under this new program, the question
remains whether immigration status will be considered an essential
element of state identity theft convictions for use of false information
for work.

98. Massey & Pren, supra note 37, at 23.
99. The criticism over programs such as Secure Communities arose not just from
advocates but also from the judicial branch. Courts throughout the United States
questioned the constitutionality of the federal government’s detainer request policies,
which required local and state law enforcement agencies to detain undocumented
noncitizens after arrest. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 2 n.1 (citing Miranda-Olivares v.
Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1 (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2014)
(holding that county violated the Fourth Amendment by honoring an ICE detainer that
did not provide probable cause regarding removability); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F.
Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.l. 2014) (holding that detention under an immigration detainer “for
purposes of mere investigation is not permitted”); Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 5452,
2014 WL 4814776, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim that ICE’s
detainer procedures violate probable cause requirements); Villars v. Kubiatoski, No. 12
CV 4586, 2014 WL 1795631, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2014) (allowing Fourth Amendment
claims that ICE detainer was issued without probable cause of an immigration violation);
Uroza v. Salt Lake City, No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *6–7 (D. Utah Feb. 21,
2013) (denying dismissal on qualified immunity grounds where plaintiff claimed that
immigration detainer without probable cause); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012
WL 1080020, at *15 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2012) (denying qualified immunity to
immigration officials who issued immigration detainer without probable cause), rev’d on
other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (2014) (reversing district court’s finding of no municipal
liability)).
100. Johnson, supra note 95, at 1–3.
101. See id. at 2.
102. Memorandum, Jeh Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3 (Nov. 20, 2014),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial
_discretion.pdf.
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The Supreme Court has addressed the treatment of
undocumented workers in several cases that ultimately limit the
ability of federal and state governments to read employer sanctions
provisions expansively. The next section discusses the most important
of these cases.
E.

The Supreme Court Cases on Worksite Immigration Enforcement

Employers continue to be the focus of the employer sanctions
provisions. The Supreme Court continues to limit the authority of
federal agencies and the states to sanction employees. The Court has
used statutory interpretation principles as well as constitutional
structural arguments grounded in federalism to enforce this limited
state authority at the same time that it has confirmed the federal
nature of immigration regulation.
1. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB (2002)
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB,103 the Supreme Court
decided the contours of workplace rights available to undocumented
workers.104 Although IRCA’s employer sanctions prohibited the
knowing employment of unauthorized workers, the statute did
nothing to diminish the workplace protections of undocumented
workers; in fact, post-IRCA decisions in several fields of employment
and labor law reaffirmed the principle that employment and labor law
remedies were available to all workers regardless of immigration
status.105 The issues in Hoffman tested this principle.
Hoffman arose out of an unfair labor practice claim alleging the
employer had retaliated against several workers for participating in a
labor organizing drive.106 The NLRB ruled in favor of the workers,
including Jose Castro.107 At a subsequent hearing to determine
103. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
104. Id. at 150–52.
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. APRA Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that IRCA “did not diminish the Board’s power to craft remedies for
violations of the NLRA”), abrograted by Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535
U.S. 137 (2002); Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the
argument that Congress did not intend to cover undocumented workers as “contrary to
the overwhelming weight of authority”); EEOC v. Switching Sys. Div. of Rockwell Int’l
Corp., 783 F. Supp. 369, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Plaintiff plainly is correct that Title VII’s
protections extend to aliens who may be in this country either legally or illegally.”). But
see Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff had no cause of action seeking reinstatement because of his expired work
authorization).
106. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
107. Id.
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damages, Castro testified that he was not authorized to work in the
United States and that he had used the birth certificate of a U.S.
citizen friend to obtain employment.108 The administrative law judge
found that Castro was not entitled to back pay or reinstatement as a
result of his testimony.109 The NLRB reversed as to backpay and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.110
The Supreme Court vacated the backpay award, reasoning that
the policy rationales behind IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions
were not within the ambit of the NLRB’s expertise and, therefore, the
NLRB’s decision was not entitled to deference from the Court.111 The
Court noted that IRCA made workplace immigration enforcement
central to immigration policy.112 Changes in the 1986 law included the
establishment of an employer verification system, the imposition of
civil and criminal penalties for knowingly hiring undocumented
workers, and a prohibition on the use of false documents to obtain
employment.113 The Court noted:
Under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented
alien to obtain employment in the United States without some
party directly contravening explicit congressional policies.
Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent
identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCA’s
enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the
undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA
obligations.114
In this instance of potentially contravening federal policies, the
Court found that the agency’s adherence to one federal policy
potentially undermined the other.115 It noted that the federal law
established the penalties for fraudulent identification to obtain work
and that the NLRB’s position would undermine immigration policy,
including the policy stated in the statute to criminalize the use of
fraudulent documents for work.116 The Court’s reasoning left the
federalism structure intact: Because the policies under review were
both federal, the Court did not need to address the preemptive
108. Id. at 141.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 141–42.
111. Id. at 149.
112. Id. at 147–48.
113. Id.; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100
Stat. 3359, 3360–63 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)).
114. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148.
115. Id. at 149.
116. Id. at 150–51.
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authority of the federal government over the states in immigration
regulation.
2. Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009)
In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal
aggravated identity theft statute that is mirrored in many state
identity theft laws.117 The provision imposes a mandatory jail sentence
for certain predicate crimes if the accused “knowingly . . . uses,
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person.”118 The statute requires proof that the defendant committed a
predicate crime involving some sort of fraud.119 The predicate crimes
listed in the statute include immigration violations in which the
federal government is the victim of the fraudulent activity, such as the
use of counterfeit visas to seek entry into the United States.120
Notably, however, none of the enumerated predicate crimes
specifically involve the use of false Social Security numbers to obtain
work.121 After his employer reported to ICE that Flores-Figueroa had
submitted a counterfeit Social Security number and alien registration
cards, the federal government charged him with two immigration
offenses.122 The immigration offenses included entering the United
States without inspection and misusing immigration documents.123
The government also charged him with aggravated identity theft, the
crime at issue in the case.124
Using statutory interpretation methods, the Supreme Court held
that the provision requires the government to show that the
defendant knew that the identity he was using actually belonged to
another person.125 The mere use of a false Social Security number for

117. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a) (2012) (creating additional penalties for identity theft committed in connection
with certain enumerated felonies). For an example of such a state statute, see ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2009 (2010).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
119. Id. § 1028A(a), (c).
120. Id. § 1028A(c); see also id. § 1546(a) (prescribing fine or imprisonment for up to
twenty-five years for creating counterfeit visas).
121. Id. § 1028A(c).
122. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 649.
123. Id. (noting charges for violation of 8 U.S.C. §1325(a), entrance without inspection,
and 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), misuse of immigration documents).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 657.
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identification purposes, in other words, was insufficient to sustain a
conviction.126
While the Court did not dwell on the predicate immigration
offenses at issue in the case, they are important for their focus on the
federal government as the victim of these offenses. In each of the
predicate offenses—entry without authorization and misusing
immigration documents—the fraud is alleged to be against the
government and not against an individual.127 Through these identity
theft statutes, Congress has spoken as to the level and degree of
sanction for using false documents before the federal government.128
Like employer sanctions in the immigration statute, in other words,
Congress has circumscribed when a defendant should face an
aggravated identity theft conviction for immigration violations. Both
of these offenses are clearly immigration-related.129 Entering the
United States without inspection is a misdemeanor offense that
carries a six-month sentence and a fine if convicted.130 Misusing
immigration documents for an immigration benefit is much more
circumscribed than general document fraud and specifically affects
the federal government’s regulation of immigration.
3. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting (2011)
In this case, the Supreme Court used statutory interpretation
principles to interpret the licensing exception of the employer
sanctions provisions of IRCA in favor of state regulation.131 The
provision at issue preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”132 The Arizona
legislature passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act133 providing that
the licenses of employers who knowingly hired undocumented
workers would be suspended or revoked.134 The Court read the
126. See id. at 647 (holding that the aggravated identity theft statute requires
knowledge that the “means of identification . . . belonged to another” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (entering the United States without inspection); 18
U.S.C. § 1546(a) (misusing immigration documents).
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
131. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).
132. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat.
3359, 3368 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)).
133. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, -212, -212.01 (2010)).
134. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212.F.1.(d), -212.F.2.
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federal statute as expressly exempting from preemption the type of
statute that Arizona implemented because it was within the exception
that Congress provided in the federal statute.135
Notably, the Court’s rationale referred both to the federal power
to regulate immigration and the state’s authority to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the state.136 The
Court noted that this shared authority was much clearer before
Congress enacted IRCA in 1986 and occupied the field of
immigration regulation in the workplace through its employer
sanctions provisions.137 The Court’s opinion provides some guidance
about the preemptive authority of congressional action.138 Here, the
Court noted that Congress specifically exempted licensing power
from its worksite immigration enforcement scheme.139 This exemption
made state regulation of business licenses possible.140
While the Court’s opinion may seem to offer broad powers to
the states to regulate at the intersection of state police power and
immigration regulation, its subsequent opinion in Arizona v. United
States141 reinforced the principle of federal authority over immigration
regulation and its preemptive power.
4. Arizona v. United States (2012)
Importantly, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court
struck down a state law provision criminalizing unlawful work for
employees.142 The majority reasoned that because the purpose of the
employer sanctions provision was to sanction the employer and not
the employee, and because congressional action preempts state action
when it comes to workplace immigration regulation, the state’s
employee sanctions provision was invalid.143 The Court noted that
“[p]roposals to make unauthorized work a criminal offense were
debated and discussed during the long process of drafting
IRCA . . . [b]ut Congress rejected them.”144 State efforts to circumvent

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973.
Id. at 1974.
Id. at 1974–75.
See id. at 1977–87.
Id. at 1977–78.
Id. at 1987.
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Id. at 2510.
Id. at 2505.
Id. at 2504 (citation omitted).
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congressional intent by criminalizing work based on immigration
status are, therefore, preempted.145
Justice Scalia, in dissent, notably argued that for structural
constitutional and extra-constitutional reasons (including the need to
balance federal sovereignty with the sovereignty of the states), the
states should be allowed to regulate immigrants’ workplace activity.146
Scalia argued that the majority made unsupported assumptions about
congressional intent in deciding that state employee sanctions are
preempted.147 Commenting on the significance that the majority
placed on Congress’s 1986 efforts to penalize employers for the hiring
of undocumented workers, he noted that express preemption over
employer sanctions does not necessarily preclude state regulation.148
Instead, specifically preempting punishment for employers implies a
lack of preemption for those who seek employment.149
Justice Scalia provided an alternative reading of congressional
intent in implementing employer sanctions provisions at the same
time that Congress rejected employee sanctions:
There is no more reason to believe that this rejection was
expressive of a desire that there be no sanctions on employees,
than expressive of a desire that such sanctions be left to the
States. To tell the truth, it was most likely expressive of what
inaction ordinarily expresses: nothing at all.150
Justice Scalia’s dissent signals deep divisions about the roles of the
states and the federal government in immigration regulation. It also
provides fodder for states’ arguments that they should be able to
enforce criminal identity theft statutes for false use of Social Security
numbers as a form of employee sanction because of congressional
silence on the issue.
While the Court struck down the Arizona provision criminalizing
unauthorized work,151 the question remains as to the effect of Arizona
v. United States on similar efforts to regulate immigration through
other state laws. Arizona’s own statute criminalizing use of false
identity to obtain work152 is currently being challenged by a group of

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 2505.
See id. at 2511–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2514.
Id. at 2519–20.
Id.
Id. at 2520.
Id. at 2505 (majority opinion).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2008(A), 13-2009(A)(3) (2010).
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individuals and immigrant organizations, and a federal district court
has issued a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.153
F.

The Criminalization of Identity Theft and the Victimization of
Individuals at the Federal Level: The Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998

Congress arguably left open the possibility for states to regulate
immigration through identity theft statutes by amending the federal
identity theft statute to provide broader protections for individuals.
This section explores Congress’s amendments and its intent.
In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act,154 aimed at providing remedies to individual victims
of identity theft or fraud.155 According to the Senate Report on the
1998 legislation, the previous versions of identity theft statutes did not
provide effective remedies to individuals but instead focused on the
effects of fraud or identity theft on institutions such as banks, credit
card companies, and the federal government.156 The previous versions
of the statute also focused on theft of documents rather than the
other forms of acquiring and appropriating individuals’ identity
information.157 The 1998 Act added to the existing identity theft
statute a provision prohibiting:
knowingly transfer[ring], possess[ing], or us[ing], without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person with the
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a
felony under any applicable State or local law.158
This provision, therefore, effectively expanded potential victimhood
to persons whose identity was used in the commission of any federal
crime or state or local felony.159
The 1998 Act expanded the scope of identity theft in another
important way. The previous version of the statute made the transfer,
production, or possession of fraudulent documents a federal crime if

153. Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, No. CV-01356-PHX-DCG, 2015 WL 58671, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 5, 2015) (granting a preliminary injunction).
154. Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028 (2012)).
155. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4–8 (1998).
156. See id. at 6.
157. See id. at 5.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7).
159. See id.
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it affected interstate commerce or the mails.160 The 1998 amendments
added the “use” of fraudulent “means of identification” to the
definition of document and identity fraud, expanding the ambit of
potential criminal defendants.161 The Senate Report stated that “such
inclusion automatically makes identity information crimes subject to
the exclusion (section 212(a)(2)) and deportation (section 237(a)(2))
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”162 While
Congress understood the immigration consequences of this provision
of the statute, it saw no need to interfere with its already-existing
penalty structure for employment verification fraud.163
The expansion of the federal identity theft crime has facilitated
the construction of the identity theft victim as anyone whose personal
information has been used in any way. In other words, the taking of
identity includes the taking of anything virtual or otherwise that
might elicit the essence of that person. The federal statute continues
to require, as an element of the crime, an unlawful taking of a benefit
such as money, credit, or services. Arguably, there is no taking of a
benefit in the act of using a false Social Security number to obtain
employment.
Anti-immigrant sentiment often drives attempts to categorize the
use of false identity for work as a crime. After the identity theft law
was enacted in 1998, advocates continued to seek a specific statutory
provision that addressed false use of Social Security numbers
specifically for work.164 Advocates such as the Center for Immigration
Studies (“CIS”) have been outspoken in their intent to target
immigrants with this provision.165 The CIS, for example, in a recent
call for further changes to the federal identity theft statute, noted that
the fraudulent use of identity information for work was one form of
identity theft that native-born individuals do not commit:
Illegal aliens engage in varieties of identity fraud Americans are
unlikely to commit, including illegally applying for U.S. IDs

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 10–11.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See RONALD W. MORTENSEN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, ILLEGAL, BUT
NOT UNDOCUMENTED: IDENTITY THEFT, DOCUMENT FRAUD, AND ILLEGAL
EMPLOYMENT 16 (June 2009), available at http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/
2009/back809.pdf.
165. See id.
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such [as] passports or driver’s licenses, as well as using those
IDs to obtain jobs they are not authorized to have.166
The CIS concluded its analysis of identity fraud by noting that
the statute should clearly state that use of identity information for
work-related purposes is a crime.167 It called for a “fix” to the statute
that would “ensure persons who commit identity theft or fraud for the
purpose of unauthorized employment or hiring or harboring
unauthorized employees are punishable under both [18 U.S.C.]
Sections 1028 and 1028A.”168 Such a fix would actually change the
scope of the statute and redefine and expand the traditional forms of
identity theft to reach false use of a Social Security number for work.
Nothing in the statute currently requires such an interpretation.169
Moreover, while the legislative history makes mention of immigration
fraud, it does not list the false use of Social Security numbers for
employment as a specific danger it seeks to avoid.170
The CIS position does not make sense in the context of a system
intended to focus on the harm to the institution or person receiving
and processing the information (i.e., the bank, the credit card
company, or the government) due to the unlawful appropriation of a
benefit (i.e., money, credit, or services).171 In the workplace context,
the use of false identifying information is collateral to the employeremployee relationship,172 which is itself more of a contract for labor
than an exchange of benefits. The nature of the employment
relationship, in other words, takes the use of false identifying
information to obtain work outside the realm of the Identity Fraud
and Assumption Deterrence Act, which addresses the harm to an
individual related to the taking of a benefit.173 Nothing in the federal

166. Kephart, supra note 6, at 2.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2012) (requiring intent to “commit, or to aid or abet,
or in connection with” a violation of federal law or a felony under state or local law).
170. Cf. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 7–8 (1998) (describing several forms of identity theft,
including theft of information for nefarious reasons such as the usurpation of a person’s
credit or financial accounts, or to run up debt). Notably, the Report does not allude to the
false use of Social Security numbers for work as a danger that the Senate sought to protect
against. See id.
171. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
172. Arguably, the master-servant relationship is a form of a contractual relationship in
which a service is exchanged for payment. The identity of the parties does not define the
relationship as much as the exchange of payment for services.
173. Cf. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4–6 (1998) (identifying Act’s purpose as preventing
theft of identifying information for purposes of racking up victims’ credit card debt or
facilitating organized crime, but not for obtaining work).
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statute explicitly changes the comprehensive workplace immigration
regulation scheme created and refined by Congress over the years.174
Even when Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, it understood that false use of Social Security numbers
for work should not be penalized.175 Accordingly, Congress amended
the Social Security fraud provisions to ensure that immigrants
legalized under the 1986 Act would not run afoul of those
provisions.176
Nonetheless, since the passage of the Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act, states have enacted provisions in their
identity theft statutes to cover the false use of identifying information
for work. Arguably, convictions under these statutes can be treated as
felonies relating to immigration offenses, which are considered
aggravated felonies under the federal aggravated identity theft
statute.177 The following Part describes state efforts to expand the
definition of identity theft to cover immigration regulation in the
workplace.
II. THE STATES’ ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE “WRONGFUL”
DOCUMENTATION IN EMPLOYMENT
A. State Identity Theft Statutes
Over the past decade or so, states have enacted or amended
identity theft statutes to criminalize the false use of Social Security
numbers or other identifying information for employment. Such laws
are ostensibly and sometimes explicitly aimed at reserving jobs for the
native-born, majority-white populations in those states.178 These laws
have been enacted in the midst of growing rhetoric that immigrants
are “taking our jobs,” a frustration with the federal government’s
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(e).
176. Id. (exempting certain noncitizens from the definition of fraud under the Social
Security Act).
177. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of state statutes creating identity theft felonies.
The federal aggravated identity theft statute states that conviction of a felony that can be
categorized as a felony relating to immigration offenses is an aggravated felony. See 8
U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(10).
178. See Nigel Duara, Judge Blocks Arizona ID Theft Law Targeting Job-Seeking
Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-arizonaimmigrants-20150106-story.html (describing how the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Department used the Arizona identity theft statute to target undocumented immigrants in
the workplace). See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1707 (1993) (providing a critical-race-theory analysis of the ways in which laws and the
legal system maintain white privilege in the form of rights and property).
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failure to effectively control the border, and a growing sense of moral
superiority over those who have the “wrong documents.”179 Against
this background of rhetoric against undocumented immigration, the
criminalization of false identities for work has infiltrated the state
criminal regulation landscape, either through legislation, judicial
opinions, or both. This section explores these laws and their possible
effects on workplace relations and on the environment created in the
shadow of the law in immigrant workplaces.
To date, eleven states—Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Utah, and Wisconsin—have enacted laws or amended alreadyexisting laws to define identity theft as the use of false identifying
information to obtain employment.180 All have passed such statutes
since the enactment of the federal Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act.181 Of these eleven states, five—Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, South Carolina, and Utah182—also passed general anti179. For an example of such rhetoric see Illegal Aliens Taking U.S. Jobs, FED’N FOR
AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-aliens-taking-u-s-jobs (last
updated Mar. 2013).
180. Act of May 14, 2012, No. 2012-368, 2012 Ala. Acts 919, 920 (codified as amended
at ALA. CODE § 13A-8-192 (2012)); Legal Ariz. Workers Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess.
Laws 1312 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, -212, -212.01
(2010)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, § 4, 2011 Ga.
Laws 794, 800 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-121.1 (2011)); Act of Apr. 21, 2003, ch.
49, § 1, 2003 Iowa Acts 92, 92 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 715A.8 (2015)); Act
of June 30, 2006, No. 246, § 5, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 687, 687 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.65 (2006)); Act of April 24, 2003, ch. 562, § 8, 2003 Miss. Laws
968, 975 (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-19 (2011)); Act of May 26,
2009, § 10, 2009 Neb. Laws 252, 255–56 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-638
(Supp. 2014)); Act of Mar. 27, 2013, ch. 107, § 1, 2013 N.D. Laws 413, 413–14 (codified as
amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2013)); Financial Identity Fraud and Identity
Theft Protection Act, No. 190, § 8, 2008 S.C. Acts 1583, 1608–09 (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-510 (2013)); Act of Feb. 13, 2009, ch. 164, § 1, 2009 Utah Laws
623, 623 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-1102 (West 2009)); Act of July
24, 2003, No. 36, § 22, 2003 Wis. Sess. Laws 465, 468 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT
§ 943.201 (2015)).
181. See supra note 180. This Article discusses the redefinition of identity theft to
include the use of false information to obtain work. Some states, such as Missouri and
Minnesota, have instead, or also, interpreted their forgery statutes to criminalize the use of
false information to obtain work instead. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Reynua, 807 N.W.2d 473,
477–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting state forgery law to include the use of false
documents to obtain employment); Missouri v. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d 5, 9–10 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2013) (holding that state forgery law was not preempted by federal immigration
where a job applicant used a false Social Security number). Iowa criminalizes the use of
false information to obtain work in both its forgery and identity theft statutes. See IOWA
CODE § 715.A8(2) (2003).
182. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, No. 2011-535,
2011 Ala. Laws 888 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-30, 32-6-9 (2011))
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immigration statutes.183 These state legislatures explicitly targeted
unauthorized immigration as they enacted identity theft provisions
related to obtaining work. For example, the statute amending
Arizona’s identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes was
entitled “Employment of Unauthorized Aliens.”184 The Georgia
statute was entitled the “Illegal Immigration Reform and
Enforcement Act of 2011.”185 As these statutory titles demonstrate,
the intent as well as the effect of the legislatures was to criminalize
immigrants’ use of “wrong” documents in the workplace, regardless
of harm to any particular victim.
In a particularly expansive move, several states have defined
identity theft to include the use of a dead or fictitious person’s
identity. The Arizona statute criminalizes knowingly taking or
possessing the identifying information of a real, fictitious, or dead

(providing for various anti-immigration measures); Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections
of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)) (requiring, among other measures,
“a reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status of the person” “for any
lawful stop, detention or arrest” by law enforcement officials “where reasonable suspicion
exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States”); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. Laws 794 (codified
in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. (2011)) (providing for various anti-immigration
legislation, including authorizing law enforcement officers to investigate immigration
status of certain individuals); Act of June 27, 2011, No. 69, 2011 S.C. Acts 325 (codified in
scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6, 8, 16, 17, 23, 41 (2012)) (providing for
legislation similar to Arizona’s Act, including authorizing law enforcement officials to
check the immigration status of certain individuals); Utah Immigration Accountability
Enforcement Act, ch. 18, 2011 Utah Laws 228 (codified in scattered sections of UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 63G, 63I, 63J, 67, 76, 77 (West 2011)).
183. Bills were introduced in five states—Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, and
Wisconsin—but they did not become law. See H.R. 629, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 2011); H.B. 4305, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); H.R. 54, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2011); Neb. Leg. 48, 102nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011); A.B. 173, 100th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 2011).
184. Employment of Unauthorized Aliens Act, ch. 152, sec. 1, § 13-2008, 2008 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 641, 641–42 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 (2010)). In addition
to adding employment to the forms of identity theft prosecutable in Arizona, the statute
clarified the scope of the Legal Arizona Workers Act. Compare Legal Arizona Workers
Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23-211 to 23-214) (prohibiting employers from knowingly or intentionally hiring an
unauthorized alien and requiring employee identity verification), with Employment of
Unauthorized Aliens Act, ch. 152, §§ 3–6, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 641, 642–652 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-214) (amending Arizona statutes
relating to employment of unauthorized aliens). The identity theft provisions are currently
being challenged in federal court, which has issued a preliminary injunction against their
implementation. See infra notes 276–84 and accompanying text.
185. 2011 Ga. Laws 794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of GA. CODE.
ANN.).
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person without permission to obtain or continue in employment.186
The Georgia legislature, mirroring the Arizona legislation, enacted a
statute similar in its expansiveness.187 Georgia’s statute created the
offense of aggravated identity fraud if a person “willfully and
fraudulently uses any counterfeit or fictitious identifying information
concerning a real, fictitious, or deceased person with intent to use
such counterfeit or fictitious identifying information for the purpose
of obtaining employment.”188 This expansion goes beyond the federal
statute in two ways. First, it punishes the use of a fictitious person’s
identity. Second, it punishes the use of such identity for employment.
Five states—Nebraska, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Michigan, and
North Dakota—have enacted or amended statutes that criminalize
the false use of identifying information for employment as identity
theft independently of anti-immigrant legislation.189 These statutes
vary in their scope and breadth. Nebraska’s statute, like the Arizona
and Georgia statutes, criminalizes the taking or possession of a real or
fictitious person’s identifying information to obtain or continue in
employment.190 Criminal impersonation was already in the statute
when the Nebraska legislature added a provision criminalizing
“[k]nowingly provid[ing] false personal identifying information or a
false personal identification document to an employer for the purpose
of obtaining employment.”191 Also like Arizona and Georgia, the
Wisconsin statute, enacted in 2003, makes the use of the personal
identifying information of an existing or dead person to obtain
employment a felony; but, unlike those states, the Wisconsin statute
does not penalize the use of a fictitious person’s identity.192
Mississippi’s statute, enacted in 2003, prohibits obtaining another
186. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008. This definition is more expansive than the
definition that the Supreme Court endorsed in Flores-Figueroa. There, the Court decided
that to qualify for an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, the defendant had to
know that the Social Security number he was using actually belonged to someone else. See
supra Part I.E.2.
187. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga.
Laws 794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of GA. CODE. ANN.).
188. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-9-121.1 (2011).
189. Act of June 30, 2006, No. 246, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 687 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.65 (2006)); Act of April 24, 2003, ch. 562, § 8, 2003 Miss. Laws
968, 975–76 (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-19 (2011)); Act of May 26,
2009, No. 155, § 10, 2009 Neb. Laws 252, 255–56 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-638 (Supp. 2014)); Act of March 27, 2013, ch. 107, 2013 N.D. Laws 413 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2013)); Act of July 24, 2003, No. 36, §§ 15–24, 2003 Wis. Sess.
Laws 465, 467–68 (codified at WIS. STAT. §§ 943.201 to 943.203 (2015)).
190. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-639 (Supp. 2014).
191. Id. § 28-638.
192. See WIS. STAT. § 943.201.
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person’s identifying information with the intent to unlawfully use the
information for employment.193 Michigan’s statute, enacted in 2004,
prohibits the use of personal identifying information of another with
intent to defraud or violate the law to obtain employment.194
Whether or not as part of anti-immigration legislation, state
legislatures have come to define identity theft much more broadly in
the last decade or so. The legislative history of the North Dakota
identity theft statute is a clear illustration of the change in perspective
on the use of false Social Security numbers for work by immigrants.195
The statute states that a person is guilty of identity theft “if the person
uses or attempts to use any personal identifying information of an
individual, living or deceased, without the authorization or consent of
the individual, in order . . . to obtain or continue employment.”196 The
previous statute criminalized the unauthorized use of a person’s
identifying information to obtain credit, services, or something of
value without consent or through misrepresentation about consent.197
When the bill amending the then-existing statute was introduced in
January 2013, the amendment added a criminal penalty for using the
personal identifying information of another to interfere with a
contractual or service agreement.198 Although the proposed
amendment did not originally include the use of personal identifying
information to obtain employment, it was changed to include the
“obtain or continue employment” language and reintroduced on
January 30, 2013.199 The testimony of P. Grossman, Director of the
Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division of the Office of the
Attorney General, to the Senate Judiciary Committee explains why
his office supported the amendment to the bill:
The landscape has changed since the identity theft statute was
first enacted. At that time ID theft involved the theft of
193. Act of Apr. 24, 2003, ch. 562, § 8, 2003 Miss. Laws 968, 975–76 (codified at MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 97-45-17).
194. Identity Theft Protection Act, No. 452, § 5, 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 1856, 1857
(codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.61 to 445.77).
195. See H.B. No. 1280, Legislative History, 63rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013),
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/63-2013/library/hb1280.pdf?20140609095843
(containing testimony and minutes relating to the proposed anti-theft statute).
196. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2013).
197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2011) (amended 2013); see also Bill Versions for
House Bill 1280, N.D. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/632013/bill-index/bi1280.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2015) (providing information and
marked-up version of House Bill 1280).
198. See H.B. No. 1280, Legislative History, 63rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013),
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/63-2013/library/hb1280.pdf?20140609095843.
199. See id.
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personal identifying information for monetary or financial gain.
Now, identities are stolen for other purposes, including
obtaining employment, initiating or cancelling service contracts,
committing a criminal offense in another person’s name, or
impersonating an individual by e-mail, website, or social media
to harass, harm, defraud, intimidate or threaten another
person.200
The bill essentially made it easier to prosecute the “wrongful” use of
documents by eliminating the element of economic loss to the
individual whose identifying information has been used. This type of
expansion of the identity theft definition—here, and in the other
statutes described above—facilitates an understanding of the false use
of a Social Security number for work as a form of theft, even when
the individual victim has suffered no real economic harm.
B.

Other State Criminal Offenses

While this Article focuses on identity theft statutes, it deserves
mentioning that states have enacted criminal statutes that apply more
broadly to the use of false Social Security numbers. In Idaho, for
example, the legislature amended an existing law to make it a crime
to knowingly make a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation in an attestation or to knowingly provide a false Social
Security number.201 In Utah, the legislature enacted a statute directing
state agencies to use DHS databases to verify the lawful presence of
individuals applying for federal, state, or local benefits, licenses, or
home loans.202 Minnesota and Missouri both have forgery statutes
that courts have interpreted as applying to false information to obtain
work.203 False citizenship claims are considered criminal offenses
under these statutes.204
California’s penal code includes a general statute criminalizing
false claims to citizenship or alien status.205 This provision was

200. Id.
201. Act of Apr. 11, 2011, ch. 281, § 1, 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 760, 762 (codified at
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-7903 (2012)).
202. Construction Licensees Related Amendments, ch. 413, § 14, 2011 Utah Laws 2932,
2953 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-11-104 (West 2011)).
203. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Reynua, 807 N.W.2d 473, 476–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011)
(interpreting state forgery law to include the use of certain false documents to obtain
employment); Missouri v. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d 5, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a
job applicant who uses forged documents—such as a Social Security card—may commit
the crime of forgery under state law).
204. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.22 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 575.060 (West 2014).
205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (West 2014).
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originally enacted through the initiative process as part of California’s
Proposition 187 in 1995.206 That proposition was focused on limiting
immigrant use of public government resources.207 This provision
survived the constitutional challenge that defeated much of the rest of
the proposition,208 providing an impetus for states to consider
criminalizing immigration-related behavior. The California statute
was re-enrolled into the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011,
which amended the penal code to define as a felony the use of false
documentation to conceal citizenship or alien status.209 These statutes
focus on the outcome of false use of Social Security numbers, rather
than the act itself. They criminalize the use of false information to
make citizenship claims or to hide immigration status. In this way,
even though they are general in nature, states can use these statutes
to target use of false Social Security numbers in the workplace.
C.

Judicial Opinions Interpreting General Identity Theft Statutes

At the judicial level, at least ten state courts have begun to
interpret general identity theft laws (those that do not explicitly
criminalize the use of false identifying information for employment)
to include the use of false identifying information for work.210 In each
of the cases, the courts view false use of identifying information as a
form of theft in which such information is used to fraudulently obtain
a benefit such as credit, money, goods, services, or other property, or
simply to commit unlawful activity.211 Sometimes, as in the case of
Colorado, the courts merely state in dictum or assume without
holding, that using false identity documents to obtain employment

206. Cal. Prop. 187, §§ 2, 3 (1994), available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2103&context=ca_ballot_props; Jeffrey R. Margolis, Closing the
Doors to the Land of Opportunity: The Constitutional Controversy Surrounding
Proposition 187, 26 MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 376–77 (1995).
207. See Margolis, supra note 206, at 367–69.
208. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (“Any person who uses false documents to conceal his
or her true citizenship or resident alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for five years or by a fine of
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).”).
210. Case law in California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin have found that the false use of identifying
information for employment is a crime covered by the state’s general identity theft statute.
See infra Part II.C.2.
211. See, e.g., State v. Madrigal, 776 N.W.2d 301, No. 08-1623, 2009 WL 3086558 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table decision).
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violates existing general identity theft statutes.212 In other cases, the
courts make arguments that describe how the use of false Social
Security numbers in the workplace violates the general statute.213
These arguments focus on two main elements of the crime. The courts
either define the harm element by interpreting employment as a form
of money, services or property, or they focus on the “intent to harm”
element, interpreting the actual use of false information as proof of
intent without regard to actual harm or injury. This section discusses
how the courts analyze these elements.
1. Interpreting Employment as Money, Services, or Property
The prototypical case comes from Wisconsin, where the
defendant was convicted under the general identity theft statute214 for
using false identity documents for work.215 The defendant argued that
there was no intrinsic benefit or value in a job offer, as that is only the
opportunity for work, and not a benefit in and of itself.216 The court
did not agree and instead noted that what the worker “ultimately
sought and obtained was the compensation and other economic
benefits that flowed from the employment. Obviously these were
things of value within the meaning of [Wisconsin Identity Theft
Statute].”217
The same type of analysis has occurred in courts in Iowa, Illinois,
and Kansas. In Iowa, for example, where the legislature enacted both
an identity forgery statute and an identity theft statute, the courts
have interpreted these statutes to prohibit the use of false information

212. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 944 (Colo. 2009) (en banc)
(suppressing evidence regarding the use of a false Social Security number for work
because there was no probable cause and assuming that such false use of a Social Security
number would violate the state’s identity theft laws); see also Peopla v. Perez, No.
10CA0587, 2013 WL 1908991, at *8 (Colo. App. 2013) (holding that the prosecution failed
to present evidence that a false Social Security number provided the defendant the ability
to work or that the employer could not have hired him without a valid Social Security
number), cert. granted, No. 13SC465, 2013 WL 6795153 (Colo. Dec. 23, 2013).
213. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of how courts determine that false use of
Social Security numbers for employment violates general identity theft statutes.
214. WIS. STAT. § 943.201(2) (2015) (“Whoever intentionally uses or attempts to use
any personal identifying information or personal identification document of an individual
to obtain credit, money, goods, services or anything else of value without the authorization
or consent of the individual and by representing that he or she is the individual or is acting
with the authorization or consent of the individual is guilty of a Class D felony.”).
215. See State v. Ramirez, 2001 WI App 158, ¶ 18, 633 N.W.2d 656, 662.
216. See id. ¶ 7, 633 N.W.2d at 659.
217. Id. ¶ 7, 633 N.W.2d at 659–60.
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to obtain work. In State v. Madrigal,218 the Iowa Court of Appeals
reviewed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for a defendant
convicted of the identity theft statute, which, in relevant part, reads,
“A person commits the offense of identity theft if the person
fraudulently uses or attempts to fraudulently use identification
information of another person, with the intent to obtain credit,
property, services, or other benefit.”219 In analyzing the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the court determined that the statute
applied to Madrigal’s use of another’s identity to obtain work.220 In
the court’s words, “[t]he purchase of the identity information is not
criminalized, but it is the subsequent acts of fraudulently using it to
obtain a benefit that are penalized.”221 The court then explained that
employment was in and of itself a benefit.222
The Illinois Appellate Court evaluated a general identity fraud
statute that has since been repealed223 and replaced with a nearly
identical statute.224 In People v. Montoya,225 the court held that the
defendant “ ‘fraudulently obtained’ both money and services . . .”
during the course of her employment in violation of the statute,
merely by posing as someone else to obtain work.226 The current
statute states that “a person commits identity theft when he or she
knowingly . . . uses any personal identifying information or personal
identification document of another person to fraudulently obtain
credit, money, goods, services, or other property.”227 While the
current statute does not explicitly criminalize the use of a false
identity to obtain employment, case law interpreting the previous and
very similar statute includes employment in the interpretation of the
term “money or services.”228

218. 776 N.W.2d 301, No. 08-1623, 2009 WL 3086558 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)
(unpublished table decision).
219. IOWA CODE § 715A.8(2) (2015).
220. See Madrigal, 2009 WL 3086558, at *1–2.
221. Id. at *2.
222. Id. at *2 n.4 (“Section 715A.8(2) [of the Iowa Code] applies when the person
intends to obtain ‘credit, property, services, or other benefit.’ Property is defined in
section 702.14 to include ‘anything of value.’ The wages received by Madrigal would be
considered property under the statute.”).
223. People v. Montoya, 868 N.E.2d 389, 392–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see 2011 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 97-597 (West) (repealing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16G-15(a)(q) (West 2003)).
224. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-30(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014).
225. 868 N.E.2d 389.
226. Id. at 394.
227. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-30(a)(1).
228. See Montoya, 868 N.E.2d at 391–94.
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In Kansas, an appellate court interpreted the statute’s use of the
term “property” to include the benefits of employment.229 The statute
at the time, general in its application, referred to identity theft as
“knowingly and with intent to defraud for economic benefit,
obtaining, possessing, transferring, using or attempting to obtain,
possess, transfer or use, one or more identification documents or
personal identification number of another person other than that
issued lawfully for the use of the possessor.”230 The statute defined
“intent to defraud” as “an intention to deceive another person, and to
induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, to assume,
create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power with
reference to property.”231 In State v. Meza,232 the defendant used
another person’s Social Security number to induce the employer into
believing she had employment authorization.233 In interpreting its
general statute, the court defined the benefits surrounding
employment as something akin to property.234 Employee benefits and
state and federal regulatory protections, in other words, were
property rights attached to the job.235 Like the other courts using this
logic, by framing employment as a form of property, the court could
easily conclude that the defendant fraudulently obtained that
property.
2. Employer or Federal Government as the Victim of Fraud; Use of
False Information as Proof of Intent to Harm
In contrast, cases in other states have held that using someone
else’s documents for work meets the general identity theft statute’s
requirement for intent to harm or defraud another person.236 In these
cases, the employer is viewed as the aggrieved party.237 In a
prototypical case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, interpreting the
state’s general identity theft statute,238 held that the “intent to defraud
includes an intent to cause injury to another’s legal rights or interests”
and concluded that misrepresentation on an I-9 form signaled intent

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

State v. Meza, 165 P.3d 298, 301–02 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4018(a) (Supp. 2004) (repealed 2011).
Id. § 21-3110(9) (repealed 2011).
165 P.3d 298 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 301–02.
Id. at 302.
See, e.g., State v. Alvarez-Amador, 232 P.3d 989, 992 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
See, e.g., id. at 991.
OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800 (2013).
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to defraud the federal government.239 The court also noted that the
defendant, by misrepresenting his employment eligibility, also had
intent to defraud the employer.240 Courts have reached similar
conclusions in Indiana, Ohio, and Washington. In Indiana, for
example, the appellate court focused on the harm to the employer,
“who was subject to potential penalties for hiring a person who was
not legally permitted to work” in finding the defendant guilty of
identity theft.241 Likewise, in a Washington case where the defendant
used a fictitious person’s identity, the court held that the harm to the
employer was the employer’s inability to know the true identity of its
employee.242 The court stated:
Big Cherry Orchards is legally obligated to ensure that each of
its employees has sufficient legal status to obtain employment
in the United States. If, in fact, Mr. Tinajero was not authorized
to work in the United States, Big Cherry Orchards could incur
potential liability for employing him. To avoid potential
liability, Big Cherry Orchards must know the true identity of its
employees. Although it is unclear what Mr. Tinajero’s legal
status was at the time that he was employed, it can be inferred
that through his use of forged documents, he intentionally
deprived Big Cherry Orchards of information that may have
been material to his hiring.243
In Ohio, the court of appeals focused on the harm to a school
district when an employee used someone else’s Social Security
number to obtain employment.244 The court noted that the identity
theft statute did not require “a theft.”245 Instead, according to the
court, it merely required a showing that “the value of the credit,
property, services, debt, or other legal obligation involved in the
violation is greater than $100,000” for the offense to be considered a
felony.246 The court then noted that the legal obligation involved was
239. Alvarez-Amador, 232 P.3d at 992.
240. Id.
241. Bocanegra v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Ironically, an
employer is not subject to federal penalties unless the employer knowingly hired an
unauthorized employee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2012).
242. State v. Tinajero, 228 P.3d 1282, 1284–85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
243. Id. (citations omitted). In this case the court interpreted the state’s statute, which
states, “A person is guilty of unlawful possession of fictitious identification if the person
possesses a personal identification card with a fictitious person’s identification with intent
to use such identification card to commit . . . forgery.” WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 9A.56.320(4) (West 2013).
244. State v. Roberts, 2005-Ohio-28U, 2005 WL 23358, at ¶¶ 32–42.
245. Id. ¶ 39.
246. Id.
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the money that the school district paid the employee for her services,
which totaled more than $100,000.247
In California, one court analyzed the identity theft statute to
include the use of false identifying information even if there is no
intent to harm a victim and no harm is caused.248 A California
appellate court reasoned that use of false identifying information was
in and of itself a harm that the legislature meant to remedy.249 This
holding is broad enough to cover the false use of a Social Security
number to obtain work.
As shown in this analysis of court arguments, when courts show
their reasoning, they tend to interpret the general statutes in one of
two ways. When statutes require the taking of a benefit—such as
money, services, or property—as an element, the courts will interpret
employment as a form of benefit covered under the statute. When the
statute requires intent to harm, courts will read the actual use of false
information as proof of intent, sometimes without regard to harm or
injury.
The courts’ rationales for applying general identity theft statutes
in the workplace mirror the arguments of legislatures that have
specifically defined use of false information in the workplace as
identity theft. The very act of using false information to obtain work
is considered fraud, with or without a specific harm to a victim, in
states with companion anti-immigrant statutes. The harm is assumed
in these statutes—whether it be the loss of jobs otherwise available to
state residents, or the injury to an employer that does not know the
true identity of its worker. Alternatively, employment takes the place
of money, services, or property, as a form of benefit at risk of theft.
Applying identity theft statutes in the workplace has dire
consequences for immigrants. Not only do they face removal—a
possible desired consequence of such statutes—but they are
vulnerable to workplace exploitation. The following section describes
such consequences.

247. Id.
248. People v. Hagedorn, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879, 887–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
249. See id. The court noted that “[i]n light of the indisputable evil to be remedied with
respect to identity theft, the Legislature rationally appears to have concluded that
willfulness, when coupled with use for an unlawful purpose, provides a sufficient mens rea
for the offense, and that no injurious intent or result is required.” Id.
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D. Potential Problems with Expanding State Definitions of Identity
Theft to Include the Workplace
The problems with expanding state definitions are two-fold.
First, criminalization of the false use of Social Security numbers for
employment subjects immigrant workers to both criminal and
immigration sanctions. Second, it makes immigrant workers even
more vulnerable to workplace exploitation. This section reviews the
consequences of criminalization for immigrant workers.
1. Criminalization of Immigration-Related Activities Subjects
Immigrant Workers to Both Criminal and Immigration Sanctions
Scholars writing at the intersection of immigration and criminal
law have noted the consequences of increasing criminalization of
immigrant identity and immigration-related activity.250 There are
several ways that the overlap between immigration and criminal law
affects immigrants. At the federal level, undocumented immigrants
especially face criminal sanctions for immigration-related activity
such as illegal entry into the United States, illegal re-entry after
deportation, or smuggling.251 The imposition of new sanctions and the
expansion of existing sanctions have exponentially increased the
numbers of immigration-related convictions in the federal system.252
Immigration crimes “now constitute over half of the federal criminal
workload.”253 Illegal re-entry convictions made up a significant
portion of the 100,000 immigration prosecutions in fiscal year 2013.254
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (“TRAC”), a data
gathering organization at Syracuse University, lists over thirty federal

250. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1831 (2007); Teresa A. Miller,
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 616 (2003) (describing scholars’ efforts documenting the trend to
criminalize immigrants); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2006).
251. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2010).
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1281–82; see also David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 166–75 (2012) (documenting the rise of
federal immigration prosecutions).
254. See At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 2013:
Illegal Re-entry Prosecutions Jump 76% During Obama Administration,
TRACIMMIGRATION (Nov. 25, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/.
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criminal statutes most frequently used in immigration prosecutions.255
These include identity theft and aggravated identity theft.256
Another form of overlap between immigration and criminal law
involves the ways in which state criminal violations and convictions
increasingly carry immigration consequences, regardless of
congressional intent. The most dire immigration consequences
involve removability for running afoul of one of several enumerated
deportability or inadmissibility grounds in the immigration statute.257
With respect to identity theft convictions, a noncitizen can be
removed for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or an
aggravated felony involving fraud or theft.258 Some courts have held
convictions for identity theft crimes to be crimes involving moral
turpitude under the immigration statute.259 The Ninth Circuit, for
example, recently upheld the finding of an Arizona district court that
a conviction under the Arizona identity theft statute for use of
another person’s identification was a crime of moral turpitude.260 In
that case, the defendant was found guilty of identity theft for using
another person’s Social Security number to obtain employment.261 An
identity theft conviction can also be an aggravated felony, as defined
by the immigration statute: the statute makes a noncitizen deportable
for an aggravated felony conviction if she is convicted of a theft
offense for which the sentence exceeds one year,262 and a noncitizen
can also be deportable for a crime involving fraud or deceit for which
the loss to the victim (or to the federal government) exceeds ten
thousand dollars.263 Criminalization of false use of Social Security
numbers for work could have elements that match either one of these
deportable crimes.

255. Criminal Statutes Most Frequently Used in Immigration Prosecution,
TRACIMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/aboutLaw/ (last visited Apr. 28,
2015).
256. See id.
257. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)–(10), 1227 (2012) (listing the different forms of
inadmissibility and deportability in the immigration statute).
258. See id. § 1182(a)(2) (providing that aliens are inadmissible if they have been
convicted of, or admit to committing, a crime of moral turpitude); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)
(providing that aliens are deportable if they are convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude within five years of admission); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that aliens are
deportable if they are convicted of an aggravated felony).
259. See, e.g., Ibarra-Hernandez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).
263. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(M).
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Importantly, working without employment authorization is not,
in and of itself, a deportability or inadmissibility ground. Because
false use of Social Security numbers for work are not an actual
ground for inadmissibility or deportability, a state’s criminalization of
use of false information to obtain employment may actually
circumvent congressional intent to sanction employers—and not
employees—for unauthorized work.264 In the current political climate,
however, the federal government’s priorities reflect an emphasis on
the removal of criminal aliens.265 An undocumented worker convicted
of identity theft under a state statute for use of a false Social Security
number to obtain employment, therefore, now becomes a criminal
alien subject to removal, without regard to how the sanctions in the
workplace have shifted from employer to employee.
A third form of overlap between immigration and criminal law
that has immigration consequences involves interaction between the
enforcement of state criminal laws and federal immigration
enforcement efforts. Until recently, the federal government actively
pursued an enforcement program it called Secure Communities,
which called for a partnership between federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies to identify undocumented persons under arrest
or in custody.266 Under Secure Communities, state and local
authorities would share fingerprints with ICE, which could take
immigration enforcement action against priority removal targets.267
Under Secure Communities, ICE prioritizes “the removal of
individuals who present the most significant threats to public safety as
determined by the severity of their crime, their criminal history, and
other factors—as well as those who have repeatedly violated
immigration laws.”268 The Secure Communities infrastructure exists
today in all fifty states.269 According to ICE, more than 283,000
convicted criminal aliens have been removed since the inception of
Secure Communities in 2008.270 Although Secure Communities has
been discontinued,271 one can see how state and local authorities

264. See id. §§ 1182, 1227.
265. See Johnson, supra note 102.
266. On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced the replacement of Secure
Communities with a new enforcement priority program, the Priority Enforcement
Program, aimed at limiting removal to those who have been convicted of certain highpriority crimes. See id.
267. Secure Communities, supra note 93.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Johnson, supra note 95.
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might use federal enforcement priorities to advance their own
strategies for deporting immigrants.
State enforcement of anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona
exemplifies how identity theft statutes that cover the workplace
interact with federal enforcement and create problems for
undocumented workers.272 When Arizona enacted its Legal Arizona
Workers Act,273 Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio announced that
he would use his authority under the statute to establish a “criminal
employment squad” and conduct workplace raids to find
undocumented workers who used false Social Security numbers to
obtain work.274 Once undocumented workers were arrested under the
statute, the Sheriff’s Department would turn them over to ICE for
removal.275 The Sheriff’s strategy fulfilled the local law enforcement
agency’s objective of deporting undocumented workers, even though
the local agency lacks actual removal authority.276
A recent lawsuit filed to enjoin the state of Arizona from
enforcing its identity theft provisions demonstrates how state
enforcement harms immigrant workers.277 The lawsuit was filed by
Puente Arizona, a community-based immigrant rights organization in

272. The Justice Department investigated the Maricopa County Criminal Employment
Squad, along with other Department units, and found that its practices discriminated
against Latinos on the basis of race and national origin. See Letter from Thomas Perez,
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney,
Maricopa Cnty. (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.
273. 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, 23-211
to -214 (2010)).
274. Jacques Billeaud, Joe Arpaio Closing Controversial Immigration Squad,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/18/joe arpaio-immigrants_n_6349204.html (explaining how the squads were shut down after the
sheriff’s office was stripped of special federal immigration powers). Sheriff Arpaio is
infamous for using his office to carry out anti-immigrant policies. See Joe Hagan, The
Long Lawless Ride of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-long-lawless-ride-of-sheriff-joe-arpaio20120802.
275. For a description of the Maricopa County Sheriff Office’s use of identity theft
arrests to effect removal, see Terry Greene Sterling, The Handcuffing of Sheriff Joe,
NAT’L J. (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-handcuffing-ofsheriff-joe-20140731.
276. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (“Any alien (including an alien crewman) in
and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be
removed if the alien is within one or more of [several] classes of deportable aliens.”).
277. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Memorandum of Points &
Authorities at 1–2, Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. 2:14-CV-01356-DCG (D. Ariz. Aug. 7,
2014).
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Phoenix.278 The lawsuit asserts that its members will suffer significant
hardship if the state provisions are enforced.279 Puente Arizona
members testified through declarations that they feared arrest and,
therefore, were reluctant to exercise their labor rights as a result of
Arizona’s enforcement of its provisions.280 Some of the declarations
described the experience of being arrested and detained for violating
the state’s worker identity provisions.281 The lawsuit claims that the
implementation of the identity theft provisions has “created a state
scheme for regulating the employment of undocumented workers.”282
Sheriff Arpaio claimed the statute provided his department the legal
authority to establish a criminal employment squad to carry out
workplace raids and arrest workers on identity theft charges.283
Consequently, the fears of immigrant rights organizations that local
law enforcement authorities would use such statutes to enforce
removal through attrition were realized. The Department conducted
over eighty raids and arrested more than 790 workers through the
operation of its criminal employment squad284 before a federal district
court recently enjoined the practice.285
The Arizona case and its effects—both in implementation and
enforcement of the statute—is generalizable to the rest of the states
that have enacted or interpreted their identity theft statutes to apply
to the use of false information to obtain employment. By enacting
these statutes, states have made criminals of immigrants who use false
information of real or fictitious individuals to gain or keep
employment. In doing so, they have claimed authority—whether
directly, as with Sheriff Arpaio in Arizona, or indirectly, by simply
claiming an interest in the purely criminal aspects of identity theft—
over the treatment of undocumented workers in the workplace.

278. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3–4, Puente Arizona v.
Arpaio, No. 2:14-CV-01356-DCG (D. Ariz. June 18, 2014). A description of Puente
Arizona, its mission, and its activities can be found at http://www.puenteaz.org.
279. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 278, at 2.
280. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Memorandum of Points &
Authorities, supra note 277, at 23.
281. Id. at 25.
282. Id. at 2.
283. Id. at 8–10.
284. See Press Release, ACLU, Coalition Files New Suit to Halt Arpaio’s Workplace
Raids (June 18, 2014), available at http://www.acluaz.org/issues/press-releases/201406/4687.
285. See Order at 30, Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. 2:14-CV-01356-DCG (D. Ariz.
Jan. 5, 2015).
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2. Criminalization of an Otherwise Legal Activity—Employment—
Makes Immigrant Workers More Vulnerable
Because immigrant workers risk criminal conviction as well as
removal for working without proper documentation, they endure
terms and conditions of employment that are worse than those of
their native-born counterparts. For example, employers can, and
have, exposed them to more dangerous conditions (such as those that
expose workers to extreme heat or toxic substances),286 and even seek
them out for undesirable jobs.287 Additionally, immigrant workers
suffer labor law violations at a higher rate than their native-born
counterparts.288 Immigrants work disproportionately in low-wage
industries marked by poor conditions.289 At times, employer
mistreatment of immigrant workers rises to the level of criminal
activity.290 However, because undocumented workers fear retaliation
for seeking protection from abusive employers they frequently fail to
report exploitation and abuse.291 An employer may feel emboldened
knowing that an undocumented worker is less likely to bring charges
or report abuse or crime for fear of criminal sanctions or
deportation.292 Real fears of criminal and immigration sanctions,
therefore, create vulnerabilities for immigrant workers in ways that
their native-born counterparts do not experience.
Recently, the state of California enacted or interpreted state
statutes that illustrate both the vulnerability of undocumented
workers and the need for their protection in employment regulation.

286. See Pia Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in Riskier Jobs?, 46
DEMOGRAPHY 535, 535–36 (2009) (noting that immigrant workers suffer injuries at a rate
higher than all workers).
287. See ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF
WORKS: IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 156–57 (2003).
288. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 42–48 (2009),
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1.
289. See Orrenius & Zavodny, supra note 286, at 536.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Askarkhodjaev, 444 F. App’x 105, 105–06 (8th Cir. 2011)
(upholding an indictment on criminal charges, including fraud in foreign labor contracting,
for employer’s scheme to recruit and exploit recruited workers).
291. See, e.g., Teresa Scherzer, Reiner Rugulies & Niklas Krause, Work-Related Pain
and Injury and Barriers to Workers’ Compensation Among Las Vegas Hotel Room
Cleaners, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483, 485–86 (2005) (finding that only twenty percent of
immigrant hotel workers who had experienced work-related pain filed claims “for fear of
getting in trouble” or being fired).
292. See, e.g., EUNICE CHO & REBECCA SMITH, WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW
IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION AND ADVANCE LABOR RIGHTS 2
(2013), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2013/Workers-Rights-on-ICERetaliation-Report.pdf?nocdn=1.
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The California legislature enacted three statutes in 2013 in response
to growing concern over the workplace exploitation of immigrant
workers.293 In 2014, the California legislature passed a bill further
defining the rights and remedies available to immigrant workers who
suffered workplace retaliation.294 These new laws include specific
protections for immigrant workers who exercise their workplace
rights against employer retaliation.295 Among other protections, the
four laws protect workers against immigration-related discrimination
and threats and clearly define the types of information an employer
can deem misrepresentation in an employment relationship.296
The first of these laws, AB 263, provides Labor Code protections
against retaliation for immigrant workers.297 The Legislature noted
the vulnerability of immigrant workers in the employment
relationship in its declaration of purpose for the statute:
Low-wage, often immigrant, workers are the most frequent
victims of wage theft and are also exposed to the greatest
hazards at work . . . . Far too often, when workers come forward
to expose unfair, unsafe, or illegal conditions, they face
retaliation from the employer . . . . Where there are immigrant
workers involved, employer retaliation often involves threats to
contact law enforcement agencies, including immigration
enforcement agencies, if a worker engages in protected
conduct.298
AB 263 created new Labor Code section 1019, which makes it
unlawful for an employer or any other person to participate in an
“unfair immigration-related” practice against a worker in retaliation
for exercising a legal right or for conducting protected activity.299
293. See Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, 2013 Cal. Stat. 5311 (codified as amended at
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 98.7, 1019, 1024.6, 1102.5, 1103 (West 2014)); Act of Oct. 5, 2013,
ch. 577, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4679 (codified as amended at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 494.6,
6103.7, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 224, 1102.5); Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, 2014 Cal. Stat.
95 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 1019, 1024.6).
294. See Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (codified as amended at CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 1019, 1024.6).
295. See infra notes 297–314 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 297–314 and accompanying text.
297. Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, 2013 Cal. Stat. 5311 (codified as amended at CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 98.7, 1019, 1024.6, 1102.5, 1103).
298. See id. § 1, 2013 Cal. Stat. at 5313.
299. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1019 (defining an “unfair immigration-related practice” as
including any of the following activities taken for retaliatory purposes: (1) “Requesting
more or different documents than are required under [federal immigration law], or a
refusal to honor documents tendered pursuant to [federal law] that, on their face,
reasonably appear to be genuine”; (2) “Using the federal E-Verify system to check the
employment authorization status of a person at a time or in a manner not required under
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Protected activity includes actions that undocumented workers would
not typically take because of their vulnerable status.300 The statute
also allows an employee to file a civil action for equitable relief and
damages for an unfair immigration-related practice and allows a court
order to suspend an employer’s business license based on the number
of violations of the statute.301
In a signal to employers that the practice of discharging
employees who provided false work authorization would not be
tolerated, the law added new Labor Code section 1024.6.302 The
provision prohibited an employer from discharging or discriminating,
retaliating, or taking any adverse action against an employee because
the employee updates or attempts to update his or her personal
information.303
The second law, SB 666, suspends or revokes the license of a
business found by the courts to engage in such retaliation or in unfair
immigration-related discrimination for retaliatory purposes.304 It also
defines an “adverse action” as:
Reporting or threatening to report an employee’s, former
employee’s, or prospective employee’s suspected citizenship or
immigration status, or the suspected citizenship or immigration
status of a family member of the employee, former employee,
or prospective employee, to a federal, state, or local agency
because the employee, former employee, or prospective
employee exercises a right [under the Labor Code or other
relevant statutes].305

[federal law] or not authorized under any memorandum of understanding governing the
use of the federal E-Verify system”; (3) “Threatening to file or the filing of a false police
report”; or (4) “Threatening to contact or contacting immigration authorities”).
300. Id. (explaining that protected activity includes: “(1) Filing a complaint or
informing any person of an employer’s or other party’s alleged violation of this code or
local ordinance, so long as the complaint or disclosure is made in good faith[;] (2) Seeking
information regarding whether an employer or other party is in compliance with this code
or local ordinance[;] (3) Informing a person of his or her potential rights and remedies
under this code or local ordinance, and assisting him or her in asserting those rights”). The
statute also creates a civil penalty for retaliating against a worker who complains about
unpaid wages. See id. § 98.6.
301. Id. § 1019
302. Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, § 5, 2013 Cal. Stat. 5311, 5317 (codified as amended
at CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6).
303. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6 This statute was amended in 2014 to clarify that
personal information includes one’s Social Security number. See infra notes 309–12 and
accompanying text (describing the importance of AB 2751).
304. Act of Oct. 5, 2013, ch. 577, § 1, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4679, 4680 (codified at CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 494.6(a)).
305. CAL. LAB. CODE § 244(b).
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In addition, SB 666 makes it a “cause for suspension, disbarment,
or other discipline” for any California licensed attorney to report or
“threaten to report suspected immigration status of a witness or party
to a civil or administrative action or his or her family member”
because the person “exercises or has exercised a right related to his or
her employment.”306
The third piece of legislation, AB 524, clarifies that a threat to
report any individual’s immigration status or suspected immigration
status in order to obtain his or her property may constitute criminal
extortion.307 This law was enacted to target employers who refused to
pay workers their wages and instead threatened to call immigration
authorities.308
While these three statutes address some of the vulnerabilities of
immigrant work, the fourth law, AB 2751, which clarifies and expands
protections and remedies available for unfair immigration-related
employment practices, is of most interest because it signals the
current legislative purpose with respect to the use of false Social
Security numbers to obtain work.309 The statute makes clear that,
whether or not it is considered a crime, an employer cannot cite false
use of a Social Security number as the basis for an employment
decision once an employee seeks to correct work authorization
information.310 Prior to the enactment of this legislation, AB 263 had
added section 1024.6 to the Labor Code, prohibiting an employer
from terminating or otherwise retaliating against employees who
sought to update personal information, “unless [those] changes [were]
directly related to the skill set, qualifications, or knowledge required
for the job.”311 AB 2751 clarifies this provision by explaining that the
scope of the protection for updates of personal information includes
only work authorization, such as “a lawful change of name, Social

306. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6103.7.
307. Act of Oct. 5, 2013, ch. 572, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4657 (codified as amended at CAL.
PENAL CODE § 519). Extortion is defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”
CAL. PENAL CODE § 518.
308. See California Legislature Passes Historic Laws Protecting Immigrant Workers
from Abusive Employers, TEAMSTERS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://teamster.org/content/
california-legislature-passes-historic-laws-protecting-immigrant-workers-abusiveemployers (describing the impetus for the legislation).
309. See Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (codified as amended at CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 1019, 1024.6).
310. Id. § 3 (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6).
311. Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, Cal. Stat. 5311, 5313 (codified as amended at CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1024.6).
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Security number, or federal employment authorization document.”312
While employers can still discipline or terminate employees for
making false statements about educational qualifications or criminal
history, they simply cannot retaliate against employees who seek to
revise their immigration or work authorization status. This
clarification highlights the vulnerabilities of immigrant workers in the
employment relationship and at the same time declares that in the
state of California, false use of a Social Security number for work will
not be a basis for sanction, at least not in the Labor Code.
The California statutes described here respond to very real and
commonplace examples of immigrant worker exploitation, such as
employers refusing to pay for a worker’s labor or calling immigration
authorities in retaliation for workplace complaints.313 Immigrant
worker fear of retaliation is heightened in those states where the very
act of working without proper documents is criminalized.
Exploitation in those states reflects the shift from employer to
employee sanctions in ways that create a true second-class status in
the workplace. It also reflects a changing landscape that makes
employment more difficult, dangerous, and exploitative for immigrant
workers.314
III. THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STATE DEFINITIONS
OF IDENTITY THEFT FOR EMPLOYMENT
As states move to criminalize false use of Social Security
numbers and other identifying information for employment, they risk
running afoul of congressional intent to ensure that workplace
enforcement focuses on employer sanctions and not on worker
sanctions. The structural argument for the preemptive effect of
congressional activity seems strong after the Supreme Court’s
312. Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, § 3, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (codified as amended CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1024.6).
313. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages, Arias v. Angelo, No. 13-CV-00904 (E.D. Cal.
May 8, 2013) (alleging employer retaliation through threatening to report to federal
authorities and withholding of payment and benefits to the employee); Jennifer Medina,
Immigrant Worker Firings Unsettle a College Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/after-workers-are-fired-an-immigration-debateroils-californiacampus.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print; Cynthia Moreno, Immigrants to
Benefit from “Protection” Bills, VIDA EN EL VALLE (June 5, 2013),
http://www.vidaenelvalle.com/2013/06/05/1528966/immigrants-to-benefit-fromprotection.html; Press Release, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance Found., Immigrant Worker
Sues Dairy and Its Counsel for Contacting ICE in Retaliation for Asserting His Rights
(May 8, 2013), available at http://www.crlaf.org/sites/all/files/content/uploads/pressreleases/
2013/130508-pr_ICE.pdf.
314. CHO & SMITH, supra note 292, at 1–2.
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reaffirmation of the federal government’s exclusive authority over
immigration regulation, including worksite enforcement efforts.315
Congress has also, however, spoken on the issue of identity theft,
opening up the possibility for states to participate in federal
enforcement schemes to protect individuals from identity theft
harm.316
How might we reconcile these statutes with each other? More
importantly, what does federal regulation in these two arenas mean
for the possibility of state regulation? In implementing identity theft
laws that implicate worksite immigration regulation, states might
argue that they are merely aiding congressional efforts to both protect
identity theft victims and identify those who are in the country
illegally. This Part analyzes these arguments and their implications in
the legal and policy realm. First, this Part will analyze the problem
through the lens of structural federalism principles involving
preemption. It will then focus on congressional purpose in enacting
identity theft statutes and worksite immigration regulation.
A. Does State Criminalization of Use of False Social Security
Numbers for Employment Violate the Supremacy Clause?
It is a well-settled proposition that federal government activity in
the regulation of immigration preempts state activity, either because
Congress has occupied the field or because state statutes
irreconcilably conflict with congressional acts. Even before the
federal government enacted federal immigration statutes, the
Supreme Court pronounced immigration regulation a domain
belonging exclusively to Congress.317 Once Congress passed a federal
immigration statute, the Supreme Court pronounced the enactment
of federal immigration law as an embodiment of the federal plenary
power.318 Since then, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
federal immigration regulation trumps state regulation, either
315. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
316. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4–6 (1998).
317. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876) (striking down a California
statute seeking to restrict Chinese immigration); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259, 272–75 (1876) (invalidating state immigration statutes). See generally Gabriel J.
Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration
Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (discussing federal preemption over state
immigration schemes).
318. See generally Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2942 (2012) (reiterating the historical preemptive
power of federal immigration regulation); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (finding the federal government has the exclusive authority to regulate registration
and removal of noncitizens); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(finding the federal government has the exclusive authority to exclude noncitizens).
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through field or conflict preemption, or both.319 As the Supreme
Court recently noted in Arizona v. United States, “Federal governance
of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex.”320 Both of
these attributes make it that much more difficult for states to enter
the field of immigration regulation.
The federal government’s worksite immigration enforcement
scheme is broad and far-reaching. Several Supreme Court opinions,
including those discussed in Part I.E. of this Article, set out the
contours of the federal government’s preemptive effect on state
activity in the worksite enforcement arena. Specifically, in Arizona v.
United States, the Supreme Court noted that, with respect to worksite
enforcement, “IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment
that making criminals out of aliens engaged in authorized work—
aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation
because of their removable status—would be inconsistent with federal
policy and objectives.”321 With this pronouncement the Court struck
down state efforts to criminalize unauthorized work. The question is
whether the Supreme Court’s rationale applies to indirect regulation
through criminal statutes such as the identity theft statutes discussed
here.
B.

Do the Federal Identity Theft Statutes Offer a Space for State
Involvement in Worksite Enforcement?

Unlike the state statutes that specifically define false use of
identifying information to obtain employment as identity theft, the
federal identity theft statute is silent.322 It does not specifically include
a provision that defines the act of using a false identity to obtain
employment as either identity theft or aggravated identity theft.
Instead, the federal aggravated identity theft statute references the
immigration statute and penalizes the use of false documents
belonging to another person for identification relating to citizenship,
immigration documents such as passports or visas, or for immigrationrelated activities.323 To the extent these areas implicate immigration
regulation, they remain exclusively federal in nature.
There is another indicator that Congress contemplated leaving
the enforcement in worksite fraud provisions to federal authorities. In
its employer sanctions provisions, Congress restricted the use of
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
Id. at 2499.
Id. at 2504.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012).
See id. § 1028(a)(6), (7), (9), (10).
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information provided in the employment verification process to
“enforcement of this chapter and sections 1001 [relating to fraud
against the federal government], 1028 [the federal identity fraud
provision], 1546 [relating to immigration fraud], and 1621 [relating to
perjury in a federal tribunal] of title 18.”324 The purpose of this
provision was to limit the scope of crimes to which information
provided through the employment verification process could apply.
Notably, state laws were not included in that scope. Several other
sections of the employer sanctions provisions of the statute limit the
use of documents provided to verify employment to enforcement.325
In addition, Congress contemplated that in the future the executive
branch could require new or different documents for employment
verification. Contemplating that eventuality, Congress enacted the
following provision:
If the system requires individuals to present a new card or other
document (designed specifically for use for this purpose) at the
time of hiring, recruitment, or referral, then such document
may not be required to be presented for any purpose other than
under this chapter (or enforcement of sections 1001, 1028, 1546,
and 1621 of title 18) nor to be carried on one’s person.326
Congress understood that its employer sanctions provisions
would inevitably lead to the use of false identity documents.327
Congress ultimately dealt with the problem by exempting the practice
from criminalization. At the same time that Congress legalized a
generation of undocumented immigrants when it included a
legalization provision in its IRCA, Congress exempted false use of
Social Security numbers for work from the definition of fraud in the
Social Security statute.328 At the time, Congress understood that
without the exemption, the vast majority of immigrants seeking
legalization could potentially face criminal sanctions for fraud under
the Social Security Act. This indicates that Congress’s purpose was
not to make criminals out of those employees who worked with false
identification documents.
That being said, the federal government has filed criminal
charges and litigated cases against immigrants who have used false
Social Security numbers to obtain work, to varying degrees of

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5).
Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(C), (G).
Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(G).
See S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 34 (1983).
See 42 U.S.C. § 408(e).
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success.329 The facts of Flores-Figueroa v. United States, discussed
earlier in this Article,330 demonstrate how broadly federal prosecutors
have interpreted the federal identity theft statutes.331 The Court, in
response, noted examples of classic cases of identity theft, including
dumpster diving and computer hacking, signaling that immigrants
using false Social Security numbers for work were outside the scope
of Congress’s intended targets.332
C.

Are the States Regulating Immigration Indirectly by Enacting
Identity Theft for Employment Statutes?

The federal identity theft statute notwithstanding, the states
cannot regulate immigration through the back door any more than
they can through a mirror-image theory, which “rests on the
erroneous premise that Congress has implicitly authorized state
enforcement of federal immigration law.”333 The question in the
interpretation of these state statutes is whether the state statute was
enacted or interpreted to promote or enforce an immigrationregulation purpose. In other words, did the legislatures pass such
statutes criminalizing the act of working without proper
documentation as a way to enforce immigration regulation? To the
extent those statutes were enacted to target immigrants, the Court’s
pronouncement in Arizona v. United States334 would seem to apply. If
the reason for the interpretation of the statute was to target
undocumented immigration, it may be that the statute is preempted
by the federal scheme to regulate immigration in the workplace,
which includes specific sanctions for the use of false documents to
obtain work.335 This is the case with the Arizona and Georgia statutes,
for example, which evince in their titles the intent to target and
criminalize unauthorized work.336 This may also be the case with the
rest of the statutes that were enacted in the place of more general

329. See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657 (2009); Response of
Defendants at 15, United States v. Moreno-Lopez, No.: 4:09-cr-00021 (E.D. Tenn. May 19,
2010).
330. See supra notes 117–30 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
332. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 655.
333. Chin & Miller, supra note 317, at 252. The mirror-image theory posits that states
should be able to enact and enforce criminal immigration laws as long as they further the
purposes of federal immigration statutes. Id. Professors Chin and Miller critique this
mirror-image theory of state regulation. See id.
334. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
335. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), (b) (2012).
336. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
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anti-immigrant statutes, if their legislative histories betray a purpose
to regulate immigration.337
What about statutes that are more indirect or whose silence has
been interpreted by courts to apply to the use of false information to
obtain employment? Legal scholars have argued that federal law
should preempt indirect statutes that criminalize behavior related to
immigration status. Professors Chin and Miller, for example, argue
that such indirect state attempts to “mirror” federal statutes through
criminal law as a way of furthering federal purpose or intent fall
outside the scope of the state police power.338 They argue that in
criminalizing behavior that is related to immigration status, the states
must demonstrate how such status is related to a legitimate state
interest other than the desire to regulate immigration.339 The mirrorimage theory fails to provide a legitimate state interest in an
independent state police power if it is premised on deriving its
authority from federal authority.340 They conclude that the states can
only prosecute those crimes that fall within their sovereign
authority.341 With respect to constitutionality, therefore, “[t]hat one
government enacts a law within its exclusive jurisdiction does not
enlarge the constitutional authority of the other.”342
Regulation of immigration is a different premise from a state
using its police power to regulate immigrants within its boundaries.
Historically, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between state
statutes that purport to regulate immigration—which are invalid—
and state statutes that affect immigrants without necessarily affecting
immigration regulation. The Supreme Court most recently addressed
the difference in Arizona v. United States,343 holding that state
immigration regulation of unauthorized work through criminalization
was preempted.344
Courts that have addressed this problem of indirect state
regulation in other contexts have held that a preemption analysis
should consider not just the text of a state statute but its purpose and
effect as well.345 Courts determine the practical impact of the statute
when weighing the preemptive effect of a congressional statutory
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
343.
345.

See supra Part II.B.
Chin & Miller, supra note 317, at 259.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id.
Id.
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Id. at 2510.
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992).
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framework.346 Ultimately, a state law cannot “frustrate the operation
of federal law,” whether directly or indirectly, even when the
legislature “had some other purpose in mind other than one of
frustration.”347 This line of cases indicates that whether or not the
states had a purpose to regulate immigration or to encourage selfdeportation of undocumented immigrants, their entry into the
immigration regulation field through criminalization of workplace
misrepresentation would be preempted. Congress did not explicitly or
implicitly open the door to state immigration regulation when it
expanded its federal identity theft statute to include the use of false
information and to provide individuals with remedies.
In sum, to the extent that federal identity theft laws create crimes
for immigration-related fraud, the federal jurisdiction remains
exclusively federal. No state purpose, direct or indirect, gives it the
power to supersede the federal immigration scheme. Given
Congress’s occupation of the immigration regulation field, states
should not be allowed to mirror the federal identity theft crimes, even
if Congress decided not to preempt general state identity theft
statutes. Criminalizing identity theft in general has different
implications than criminalizing the use of false information to obtain
employment. To the extent that Congress maintains preemptive
authority over immigration regulation, the subset of workplace
identity theft remains in the hands of the federal government, to the
exclusion of the states.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced the history of employer sanctions
provisions and the role of worksite immigration regulation to
demonstrate how the criminalization of unauthorized work was
outside the scope of congressional intent when the employer
sanctions framework was established. The failure of past Congresses
to adequately resolve the struggles between employers pulling
workers into the United States and enforcement efforts to dissuade
the pull have resulted in a decades-long public discussion about
undocumented immigration. The discussion has led to the current
efforts to define the use of false documents for work as a form of
identity theft. Ultimately, the criminalization of unauthorized work
through state identity theft statutes operates to criminalize behavior

346. Id. at 106.
347. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651–52 (1971).
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not intended to be sanctioned under former or current immigration
schemes.
While this criminalization at the state level aids and abets
administrative decisions to turn from apprehensions to detention and
deportation as the principal means of immigration regulation in the
United States, it does little to heed congressional calls for an
employer-focused sanctioning mechanism. The increasing scrutiny on
the unauthorized worker follows the pattern of immigration
regulation over temporary workers in the United States and the
diminishing protections for an already vulnerable population. This
Article has demonstrated how the interaction between state criminal
laws and federal law regulating immigration make the current
deportation scheme today’s de facto temporary worker program. One
prescription lies in invalidating the employment provisions in state
identity theft statutes. Statutes that effect immigration regulation
through criminal law are arguably unconstitutional for structural
reasons: they encroach on congressional and executive authority,
prosecutorial discretion, and sovereignty-related concerns that belong
to the federal government.348 More importantly, they perpetuate a
line of reasoning that contradicts the very basis of worksite
immigration enforcement: to make employers accountable for
unauthorized work.

348. See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (engaging in a thoughtful description of the
contours of executive and congressional powers over immigration regulation and their
preemptive power).
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